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This paper explores the takeover of Agricore United (AU) by Saskatchewan
Wheat Pool, now known as Viterra. AU’s predecessor, United Grain Growers, was
a “pure” cooperative that had issued limited voting shares, but was legally deﬁned
as consisting of members and shareholders. The paper argues that members should
have been consulted about the transaction. The paper draws six lessons that for-
merly “pure” cooperatives like AU, should observe to prevent being absorbed by
a publicly held ﬁrm. It argues that hybrid organizations like AU can successfully
resist a takeover bid if properly prepared.
Introduction
United Grain Growers (UGG) was formed in 1906 as the Grain Growers Grain
Company (GGGC), but altered its name in 1917 after a merger with the Alberta
Farmers Cooperative Elevator Company (AFCEC). It operated as UGG until 2001,
when it merged with Agricore, which had been formed by a merger between Al-
berta Wheat Pool (AWP) and Manitoba Pool Elevators (MPE), and became known
as Agricore United (AU). In November 2006, it was subject to a hostile and ulti-
mately successful takeover bid from the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP), which,
by this time, had converted from a cooperative to a shareholder-controlled Canada
Business Corporation Act (CBCA) company. The takeover was completed in June
2007. The story of AU is therefore inseparably connected to the story of the three
pool organizations. Between 1997 and 2007, all four companies, after a century of
farmer control of grain handling, disappeared. This article focuses on the forces that
came into play in the last six months of AU’s existence, and which, in the end, were
responsible for its demise. The material in this article is based on approximately 50
interviews and conversations with grain industry directors and management, pub-
lic documents issued by the four companies, and archival material lodged in the
University of Manitoba Archives and Special Collections.
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Background
The History
When the GGGC was formed, farmers were predominantly classic liberals and
free traders who felt that they suffered from a lack of effective competition among
railways, grain companies, and manufacturers. During the 1920s, however, they
developed a more radical critique of laissez faire—a critique which became the
philosophical basis on which the three provincial wheat pools were founded in 1923
and 1924 (Earl 1992). While UGG retained the classic liberal attitudes of earlier
critics, the Pools’ generally negative view of the private sector led them to favor
centralization and regulation of grain handling, marketing, and transportation.
ThePoolswereenormouslysuccessfuluntil1929, when,inpartbecauseoftheir
reluctance to use the Winnipeg Grain Exchange for risk protection, they nearly
went bankrupt and survived only through loans from the three prairie provincial
governments.
TheGreatDepressioncalledfreeenterpriseintoquestionthroughoutmostofthe
world, including Western Canada, where the concept of a “100 Per Cent Pool by
Legislation” (Hull 1931) led to the creation of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB)
in 1935, albeit without its current monopoly powers. These were added in 1943 as a
result of wartime conditions, and were retained after the war to implement a series
of international wheat agreements (Morris 1987; 2000).
By the end of the Second World War, therefore, the industry had attained the
institutional conﬁguration and ideological divisions that persisted until the early
1990s.GrainhandlingwasdominatedbythePoolsandUGG,whichby1950owned
48 percent of the country elevators. (There were ﬁve companies larger than MPE,
the smallest of the four co-ops, that collectively owned another 38 percent. None
was as large as SWP. The remaining 14 percent were owned by about 40 smaller
companies (Canadian Grain Commission 1955/56).) The CWB had responsibil-
ity for marketing wheat, oats, and barley, which accounted for over 90 percent of
grain production. The industry was highly centralized and regulated, with most of
the grain marketing, transportation, and logistics functions managed by the CWB.
Freight rates were legislated at 1899 levels (the Crow’s Nest Pass Rates), branch
line abandonment was virtually impossible under the Railway Act, and grain han-
dling tariffs and licensing were controlled by the Board of Grain Commissioners
(Canada Grains Council 1973). As discussed below, this heavy centralization and
regulation had profound effects on the grain handling and transportation system,
and was a major factor leading to the disappearance of the co-ops.
Ideologically, the grain industry was sharply divided, with the CWB, the Pools,
and most farm organizations supporting the status quo, and the private grain compa-22 Journal of Cooperatives
nies and the railways wanting a more commercial system. UGG occupied a middle
ground between these two. By the 1960s, however, a paradigm shift had begun
to develop throughout the western world, characterized by a declining faith in the
public sector and an increasing acceptance of market-based solutions to economic
problems (McBride2005). In Canada, the 1967 NationalTransportation Act (NTA),
counterpart to the American 1980 Staggers Rail Act, was a key development in the
resulting trend to deregulation. Regrettably for some, and happily for others, the
Act retained legislated rates for grain movement.
From the late 1960s on, criticism of the highly regulated regime grew, with
claims that the grain industry had stagnated under heavy regulation and control.
In 1973, a new farm organization, the Palliser Wheat Growers Association (later
the Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association) became a vigorous proponent
of this view, and thus a new constituency took shape that wanted a more market-
oriented handling, transportation, and marketing system to emerge. There followed
twenty years of often bitter debate, focused primarily on transportation, which cul-
minated in the end of tightly regulated grain freight rates in 1994. This debate was
accompanied by some changes in marketing, with domestic feed grains, barley ex-
ports to the U.S. (temporarily), and oats all removed from CWB control.
Critics of the status quo were correct in their claim that the long period of reg-
ulation had brought signiﬁcant inefﬁciency. By 1970, the country elevators were
old and outdated, too many in number, spread over a dispersed rail network, and
decreasingly capable of handling large modern trucks. Grain moved predominantly
in boxcars until 1973, when, faced with a near-crisis in rail capacity, the federal
government made the ﬁrst of a series of hopper car purchases for grain movement
(Earl 2000).
Between 1970 and 1990, progress towards modernizing and consolidating the
country elevator and branch line system was slow, but by 1990 modernization could
no longer be delayed. The outdated system needed a huge injection of capital to
modernize, but the grain companies’ ﬁnancial returns were impaired by the cost of
the widely dispersed and inefﬁcient elevator system (Earl 2007).
The Conversion and Demise
The following major events occurred between 1990 and 2007:
1. Faced with a near crisis with their country elevator systems, all four grain
co-ops began a massive re-investment and renewal process, replacing old el-
evators with large “high throughput,” or “inland terminal” facilities, thereby
reducing the number of country elevators from 1578 in 1990 to 336 by the
end of 2007 (Canadian Grain Commission 2008).Vol. 23[2009] 23
2. UGG entered the equity market, issuing public shares in 1993. Three non-
farmer directors were added to its 15 member board, while the other 12 con-
tinued to be farmer-elected. The company then operated under new federal
legislation, the 1992 United Grain Growers Act.
3. SWP followed UGG by issuing public shares in 1996, but kept a fully farmer-
elected board.
4. MPE and AWP primarily ﬁnanced their investments through debt.
5. Allfourcompanies’balancesheetsdeteriorated,andtheﬁnancialresultswere
worsened by poor crops in 2000 and 2001 (Earl 2007).
6. MPEand AWPalmost wentbankrupt and,following afailed takeoverattempt
of UGG in 1997, merged to form Agricore in 1998. To fend off the hostile
bid,UGGsoughtaso-called“whiteknight,”ArcherDanielsMidland(ADM),
which then acquired about 40 percent of the company and occupied two of
the non-farmer director positions.
7. Agricore itself continued toward bankruptcy, and in 2001 was ﬁnally forced
into a merger with UGG to form Agricore United. This diluted ADM’s own-
ership to about 25 percent. AU continued to operate under the 1992 UGG
legislation.
8. SWP made some major errors and almost went bankrupt. By 2003, it had
abandoned farmer control and was largely controlled by its debt holders. In
2005, it became a CBCA corporation (Fulton & Lang 2006).
9. From 2004 to 2006, SWP slowly improved its ﬁnancial situation, and its
shares rose from about C$2 to about C$6. AU worked on reducing its debt
load, and its share price remained largely unchanged (approximately C$7).
10. On 7 November 2006, SWP mounted a hostile takeover of AU. AU rejected
SWP’s ﬁrst bid on grounds that it was too low, and by 12 December had
begun to explore whether other parties might be interested.
11. A rival offer by James Richardson International (JRI) led to a bidding war
that ended with SWP acquiring all outstanding shares at a price of C$20.50.1
In just over a decade and a half, therefore, the long-delayed modernization of
grain handling and transportation was ﬁnally accomplished, but it was accompa-
nied by a near revolution in ownership and control. During this period, most of the
country elevators extant in 1990 were replaced by a network of inland terminals,24 Journal of Cooperatives
while the four large and seemingly successful co-ops had been replaced with one
publicly traded company.
The story of UGG and AU over these years breaks into two parts. The ﬁrst—
which stretched from 1992 to 2006 and included conversion to a publicly traded, but
farmer-controlled, company and the merger with Agricore—was largely a success.
The second, from November 2006 to June 2007, which encompassed its takeover
by SWP, was arguably a failure.
The Operative Factors
The following description of the operative factors underlying these changes
emerged from, and was repeatedly conﬁrmed in, the interviews conducted for this
study.
• The ﬁrst factor was the 20-year, ideologically driven debate over transporta-
tion policy as described above. This delayed the modernization that was so
urgently needed, and improvements that should have evolved over the preced-
ing decades were done quickly. Because capital had not been set aside over
previous decades, new monies had to be raised, and the consequent concen-
tration of investment weakened the balance sheets of all four companies.
• At the same time, farm sizes increased, rural populations declined, and farm-
ing became more a business and less “a way of life.” Younger farmers, reﬂect-
ing the paradigm shift alluded to above, were more comfortable than their
forebears with free enterprise, and had less empathy for a co-op philosophy.
Neither the Pools nor UGG responded effectively to these changes. The gov-
ernance and policy activities of the companies did not change with the times,
and so it was not only difﬁcult to interest younger farmers in cooperative
ideals, but also to engage them in what appeared to be outdated procedures.2
• Farm populations were also aging, creating a looming “bubble” of member
equity redemptions for all four companies. Capital was needed, not only for
reconstruction but also to retire these obligations.
• Virtuallyallintervieweesforthisstudyalsonotedaninherentweaknessofco-
op boards. Except for three members of the UGG board, the directors of all
four companies came from the farm community, and all with the same skills
and background. Moreover, the director election process meant that directors
ultimately gained their position from local support and, to some extent, were
bound by local concerns. Less charitable observers spoke of the “parochial”
outlook of board members who lacked the experience, knowledge, and out-
look required to direct large modern corporations (see also Hoyt 2003).Vol. 23[2009] 25
• The weakened balance sheets resulting from the massive investment of the
1990s came on the heels of a long period of declining proﬁtability. For the
Pools, this was identiﬁed in a study conducted in the late 1980s (Touche Ross
1988; see Earl 2007 for an examination of a longer time frame).
• AU failed to address properly the implications of its conversion for the rela-
tive rights and responsibilities of shareholders and members. In the end, the
company acted as if it were fully governed by the CBCA, and hence mem-
bers, notwithstanding their status in the UGG Act (see below), had no say
in the takeover. This was arguably the most important factor contributing to
AU’s ﬁnal demise. (See Hansmann 1999 for a discussion of the way that the
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders can conﬂict.)
• Personalities also played a part. Prior to about 1990, the CEOs of all four
companies had generally been promoted internally. Later, new incumbents
enteredthesepositionsfromavarietyofbackgrounds.TheCEOsofAWPand
SWP were both strong personalities with their own ideas for their companies
and the industry, and they were widely reputed to have clashed. This clash
was one of several factors preventing the Pools from merging, a step that
might have led to preserving the three companies as a single cooperative (see
Fulton and Larson 2009).
• Within UGG, the new CEO appointed a number of new senior managers
whose commitment to, and empathy with, farmer control was less than that
of the farmer directors. Interviewees from the company identiﬁed tension be-
tween the board and management as a signiﬁcant factor in the way that events
unfolded. The AU board did not act as decisively or as proactively as they
should have to address this issue.
• A number of interviewees also identiﬁed the company’s relations with in-
vestors as a critical issue, some claiming that a co-op style of governance
was a “hard sell” with investors, and others suspecting that management had
never properly presented the beneﬁts of member control to the investment
community. Fulton and Larson (2009) point out, for example, that a member-
ship structure with farmer control tends to create a core customer base that
is committed to the company, and that customer commitment is a key factor
in commercial success. These were important points to make with sharehold-
ers.3
Someofthesefactorswerecontrollable,andAU’sfatemighthavebeendifferent
had the board of directors managed the company—and responded to the SWP bid—
differently than they did. A close analysis of events from November 2006 to June26 Journal of Cooperatives
2007 yields lessons for other similar organizations that might consider entry into
the equity market but are concerned about ﬁnding themselves the target of hostile
takeovers that could threaten the member control that is one of the essential features
of cooperative enterprise.
Conceptual Framework
The primary issue before the AU board when the SWP bid was received was
the relative rights of shareholders and members. While most interviewees from the
company (directors and management) claimed that the members’ rights were con-
sidered, they provided few details as to precisely how this was done. Overall, the
board apparently believed that their ultimate responsibility was to maximize re-
turns to shareholders. The importance of the board’s duty to shareholders grew as
the bidding process drove up share price, ultimately making it impossible to resist
the takeover. The rights of members eventually vanished from the calculus and the
board saw itself merely as an auctioneer whose sole duty was to advise the share-
holders that the offered price exceeded the value of the company as a stand-alone
enterprise, and to recommend acceptance of the highest bid. Moreover, the board
believed that they would have faced legal action from aggrieved shareholders had
they either resisted the takeover or acted to reduce shareholder value.
There is a lively debate as to whether the principle of shareholder primacy
shouldgovernmergersandacquisitions(Bakan2004;Greenwood1996;Kelly2001;
Lee 2005; Mintzberg, Simons, & Basu 2002). This article, however, does not en-
gage that normative debate. Rather, it compares the AU board’s understandings as
outlined above with a several legal commentaries on the role of a board of direc-
tors during a takeover initiative, and identiﬁes a number of discrepancies between
them.4
The Canada Business Corporation Act requires that directors of a corporation,
in exercising their “duty of care,” to “act honestly and in good faith with a view to
the best interests of the corporation” (p. 122). Legal authorities conﬁrm that the di-
rectors’ duties are to the corporation, not to any one stakeholder. Stikeman (2008),
for example, writes: “The fundamental duty of a director of ofﬁcer is to the corpo-
ration he or she serves” (p. 5). At the same time, the “shareholder primacy norm”
means that the interests of shareholders and the interests of the corporation are nor-
mally identical. According to Bakan (2004), serving the interests of the corporation
“generally means to maximize the wealth of shareholders.” In an accompanying
footnote, Bakan quotes Dr. Janis Sarra, director of the National Centre for Busi-
ness Law at Simon Fraser University: “In North America, the best interests of the
corporation have been deﬁned as the best interests of shareholders” (p. 37). Legal
scholar Gordon Smith (1998) has traced the evolution of the “shareholder primacyVol. 23[2009] 27
norm” and goes so far as to say that, from the early nineteenth century onward, it
was assumed that “shareholders collectively became the corporation” (p. 297).
In AU’s case, however, this identity between shareholders and the corporation
seems to have been challenged by the provisions of the special legislation under
which the company operated. In the ﬁrst place, sections 6 and 9 of the UGG Act
explicitly deﬁned AU’s members as part of the corporation. These sections read, re-
spectively, as follows: “The corporation continues to consist of members and share-
holders,” and “The corporation is a combined membership and share capital corpo-
ration.” Moreover, the Act’s preamble mandated that “it is desirable to maintain”
the company’s “historic connection with the farmers.” Arguably, farmer control of
the organization was part of that “historic connection.” The Act also speciﬁed that
where there was a conﬂict between it and the CBCA, the former would prevail.
By all accounts, the farmer members of the AU board were not happy with
the outcome of the takeover process, and felt that preservation of the company as
an independent entity would have been beneﬁcial for its members, for farmers in
general, and for the grain industry. Some also reported vigorous opposition from
members who shared these views. Although this dissatisfaction represents a prima
faciecasethatthemembersthoughtitwasintheirintereststopreservethecompany,
they were never consulted about the takeover. According to some interviewees, the
takeover process offered no way of measuring the relative value of farmer control
and shareholder returns.
The conclusions drawn at the end of this article turn on this distinction between
AU and a “normal” CBCA company. If the AU board, in its collective view, did
not fully understand its position and its duties, then it follows that: (1) the principle
of shareholder primacy might have been tempered by the rights of members; (2)
members might have been given a voice, and a way might have been found to weigh
shareholder and member interest; (3) the threat of legal action might have been
overrated; and (4) in the end, the takeover bid might have been successfully resisted
and the company retained as an independent, farmer-controlled enterprise.
An Analysis of the Takeover
The following analysis examines ﬁve elements of the AU board’s understand-
ings on the basis of Baxter (1988), Stikeman (2008), and Nicholls (2007).5 Each
of these three sources is a summary of the rights and responsibilities of a target
company’s board in the event of a takeover bid from, respectively, an academic,
professional, and pedagogical perspective.28 Journal of Cooperatives
Was the board’s primary responsibility to shareholders?
The Supreme Court of Canada 2004 case of Peoples Department Stores Inc
(Trustee of) v. Wise provides one of the most recent rulings on the issue of share-
holder primacy. According to Stikeman (2008), it showed, as discussed above, that
“ﬁduciary duty is owed to the corporation...rather than to its shareholders” (p. 9).
However, the Peoples judgement is controversial and went beyond this already es-
tablished principle (Lee 2005). The judgement says, the “phrase the ‘best interests
of the corporation’ should be read not simply as the ‘best interests of the sharehold-
ers’,” and “[t]he interests of the corporation are not to be confused with the interests
of the creditors or those of any other stakeholders” (Peoples Department Stores Inc.
(Trustee of) v. Wise 2004, paragraphs 42, 43). Baxter (1988) reached this same con-
clusion in 1988: “Canadian corporate law [rejects the view] that directors should
only be concerned with proﬁt-maximization to the exclusion of” non-investor inter-
ests (p. 103).
Nicholls does not address the question of shareholder primacy directly, but he
does state, unequivocally, where the directors’ duties lie. “A corporation’s directors
and ofﬁcers must, at all times, discharge their duty to act ‘honestly and in good faith
with a view to the best interests of the corporation.’ This very language is found in
many Canadian law statutes, and the essential principle existed in common law as
well” (p. 175).
None of these three authorities, therefore, supports the position that shareholder
rights trump all others. All suggest that directors owe their duty to the corporation,
not shareholders, and given the status of members under the UGG Act, it is reason-
able to infer that their arguments would have applied with greater force to AU.
Did the board have a right or responsibility to oppose the deal?
According to Baxter (1988), “directors have a right, as well as a duty, to oppose
takeovers which they believe...are not in the best interests of the corporation and
its shareholders,” and they “are entitled [to this right] in the exercise of their busi-
ness judgement” (pp. 98, 104). Stikeman (2008) says that directors need not “aban-
don a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short term shareholder proﬁt” (p.
92), while Nicholls (2007) cites Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Millar (1972) (which he
calls “an important part of the Canadian corporate law canon”) stating that directors
may oppose “a takeover that they honestly believe is not in the corporation’s best
interests.” This position is based on what he calls “the fundamental principles of
directorial responsibility.” Directors, he says, are “at times...positively obligated
to resist potentially harmful bids,” and in a footnote he quotes First City Financial
v. Genstar Corp et al. (1981): “The right and indeed the obligation of directors toVol. 23[2009] 29
[act] in the interests of the company and its shareholders...in respect of a take-over
bid, is perfectly clear and unchallenged” (pp. 180, 183; emphasis in original).
If, as suggested above, the legislation’s “historic connection with farmers” in-
cluded farmer control of the board, then farmer control was arguably also the core
of AU’s “corporate policy and effectiveness.” It would appear, therefore, that the
board may have had a duty to resist the bid.
Was AU obliged to seek other bidders?
Stikeman (2008) says that, under what is called the “Revlon duty,” directors are
mere “auctioneers” whose duty is to maximize shareholder value. The publication
alsopointsout,however,thattheRevlondutyonlyapplies“[w]hereasaleorchange
of control is ‘inevitable’,” and so a takeover bid “does not necessarily require target
directors to solicit higher third party bids” (pp. 187; 91–93). Although the “Revlon
duty” is an American concept that Canadian courts have not imposed, Nicholls
(2007) argues that there are corresponding duties under Canadian law, but that these
duties only apply when a company is “in play.” Precisely what “inevitable” and
“in play” mean is, therefore, a critical question. Nicholls seems to reject the idea
that an initial bid puts a company in play, an assumption, he says, that would go
“well beyond...Revlon and its progeny” (p. 193). Moreover, “a company with a
controlling shareholder cannot be said to be in play if there is some legal bar (such
as a statutory provision) that makes it impossible for a single shareholder to obtain
control.” He quotes the Airline Industry Revitalization Co. v. Air Canada (1999)
ruling, which stated that “Air Canada argues that it is protected from being a target
of a takeover bid by an Act of Parliament which remains in full force and effect
and which means that Air Canada is simply not ‘in play”’ (p. 192). The kind of
arguments advanced by Stikeman and Nicholls did not, apparently, inﬂuence AU
since, within a little over a month, it had “initiated contact with...a number of third
parties [regarding] an alternate transaction” (Agricore United 2006, p. 11).
It seems reasonable to infer that: (1) AU was not, in fact, “in play” in December
2006; (2) it might have followed Air Canada in arguing that its legislation precluded
it from being “in play;” and, accordingly, (3) on either count, it was not obliged to
explore “an alternate transaction,” at least as early as it did, and possibly not at all.
Was it AU’s sole responsibility to advise shareholders whether the bid was fair
and, if so, to recommend the sale to them?
Although Baxter (1988) suggests that Canadian Securities regulation “places
the target company permanently on the auction block,” he argues that this posi-
tion is not “appropriate” if directors honestly believe that the corporation (which,
in AU’s case, would have included members) would be “better served” “by the30 Journal of Cooperatives
company remaining independent.” He further states that the position of Securities
Administrators “is inconsistent with both the existing Canadian case law and the
fundamental premise of corporate governance that the directors’ role is to manage
the company” (p. 100). Stikeman (2008) is even more direct: “The Securities Acts
allow boards of directors to decline to make a recommendation with respect to a
take-over bid, provided that they state their reasons for doing so” (p. 90).
Again, the understanding of the AU board seems to have been incomplete.
Would the board have been sued if they had resisted SWP?
The following factors are relevant:
• Disgruntled shareholders may pursue what is called “an oppression remedy”
if a board does not maximize shareholder value. However, according to Stike-
man (2008), “In alleging oppression, a complainant must generally demon-
strate that it had a ‘reasonable expectation’ that the interest in question would
be protected” (p. 37). Evidently, AU shareholders did not have such expecta-
tions because, allegedly, they had continuously complained about their lack
of control under AU’s governance system. They had, however, acquired their
shares in full knowledge of that situation and were free to dispose of them if
they did not like it.
• Legal action by shareholders would not result in altering a board’s decision.
The “business judgment rule,” Stikeman (2008) argues, “is essentially a pol-
icy of judicial deference to board decisions that are reasonable, well thought-
out and taken in good faith, whether or not in hindsight they turned out to
be the best possible decisions” (p. 89). Another authority noted in 1993 that
Canadian “courts have rarely held directors responsible for breaches of the
corporate law duty of care” (Daniels & Hutton 1993, p. 216).
The question, therefore, is not whether disgruntled shareholders might have
sued, but whether AU could have successfully defended itself against legal action.
It would appear that litigant shareholders would have been up against the issue of
“reasonable expectation,” the competing rights of members under the AU legisla-
tion, and the courts’ “deference” to the board under the “business judgment rule.” In
making their case for a remedy, they also would have had to show why, given their
own repeatedly expressed concerns about AU’s governance, they suddenly had a
“reasonable expectation” that shareholder interests would completely eclipse the
interests of members.
It seems reasonable to infer from these comments, therefore, that concern over
legal action may have been exaggerated and possible defences not fully considered.Vol. 23[2009] 31
Conclusions
Lessons for Co-ops in Transition
AU’s choice to issue public shares placed it one step away from “Investor
Owned Firms” in Chaddad and Cook’s (2002) seven-stage typology of ownership
rights models. This position allowed the company to access badly needed capital,
and in comparison with AWP and MPE, which faced the same need, this seemed
to be a sound policy. It did not, however, allow it to survive the SWP takeover
bid despite: (1) the desires of farmer-directors and members; (2) the interpretation
of mergers and acquisitions law outlined by Baxter (1988), Stikeman (2008), and
Nicholls; and (3) the provisions of the UGG Act, which seemed to provide a basis
on which to mount a defence. The experience of UGG and AU provides a number
of lessons for organizations like the Western Canadian grain co-ops that need to
access capital and see equity markets as the obvious source.
1. Governance procedures must be regularly reviewed and must reﬂect the val-
ues and lifestyles of the membership.
UGG and AU failed to do this, with the result that the governance process (local
committees, delegates, annual meetings, and director elections) becoming no longer
compatible with lifestyles of modern farming.
2. On entering the equity market, the relative rights and obligations of mem-
bers and shareholders must be clearly deﬁned, and directors must have clear
guidelines for resolving conﬂicts between the two groups.
In AU’s case, even though members were a legislated part of the company, it seems
from the collective responses of interviewees that precisely what rights this provi-
sion conveyed in the event of a takeover bid were never clearly deﬁned.
3. Senior management must be fully committed to the board’s vision for the
company, and particularly to the core policies of corporate governance.
In AU’s case, the tension between board and management was longstanding and
severe.
4. Management and board must actively “sell” the vision of member control of
the corporation to the investment community.
There remains considerable doubt, in the minds of at least some senior former AU
people as to whether the beneﬁts of the governance structure were convincingly
represented to investors.32 Journal of Cooperatives
5. A regular “SWOT” analysis of the environment is essential, including a care-
ful assessment of who potential buyers of the ﬁrm might be and their ﬁnancial
capability of completing a purchase.
AU signiﬁcantly underestimated the danger of a takeover, believing that there was
no company interested or capable of executing such an action.
The foregoing ﬁve points all represent steps that must be taken long before any
threat of a takeover appears, but they also constitute an essential foundation for
resisting a takeover bid should it arise. The most important lesson that comes from
the AU experience, however, is this:
6. The company should ensure that it has a “game plan” to deal with a hostile
takeover bid — one that focuses on member control as the fundamental com-
ponent of the company’s “corporate policy and effectiveness” and includes
defensive mechanisms designed to defeat any hostile takeover.
What AU Might Have Done
In AU’s case, the literature reviewed for this study suggests that their game plan
might have entailed responding to the initial bid with the following points:
We do not believe an acquisition of AU shares by SWP is in the interests
of this corporation. We believe that our “corporate strategy and effective-
ness” is inextricably linked to the continuation of member-control of AU.
We cite the provisions of our legislation as the fundamental basis for
our rejection of the SWP bid, which clearly mandates that “it is desirable to
continue our historic connection with farmers,” which we construe to mean
preserving the essential features of our governance system. That historic
connection would be severed if this bid were to succeed.
We further maintain that our legislation makes our members more than
merely “stakeholders” (like customers, debtors, employees, society at large)
and,indeed,givesourmembersanequalvoicewithshareholdersindeciding
the future of this company.
We recognize that if 75 percent of shareholders wish, they “may, by
resolution, authorize the directors to apply for the continuance of the corpo-
ration...under” the CBCA (UGG Act, s. 24(1)). However, we believe that
such a step is not in the interests of the corporation and our “intrinsic value”
(see Baxter 1988, pp. 99–100) is much higher than indicated by the current
price of our shares, and would be destroyed by the success of this takeover.
We cannot, therefore, prevent SWP from continuing to purchase our
shares and acquire 75 percent of same from existing shareholders. If, how-
ever, they continue to do so, it is our intention to solicit and weigh the opin-Vol. 23[2009] 33
ions of our members regarding the takeover, and will consider following the
procedures discussed in Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Millar (1972; see Nicholls
2007, pp. 179, 180) and issue a second class of shares (“member shares”) to
our members to provide them with a formal vote on the issue of converting
to a CBCA company.
This statement would have been issued as a directors’ circular, and would have
been much longer than this, explaining why the Act read as it did, and would have
built a case around the “corporate strategy and effectiveness” that the company was
pursuing.
If AU had taken the foregoing steps, both over the decade or so prior to its
demise and when the SWP bid was ﬁrst made in November, 2006, it might have
survived as an independent entity “meeting farmers’ business needs.”6
Can Hybrids Succeed?
What can be inferred from the UGG/AU experience as to the future of “hybrid”
organizations that seek to access equity capital while retaining member control?
Do they represent a viable alternative for a co-op whose capital needs cannot be
effectively met by the traditional means open to co-ops of debt and member equity?
Or does AU’s experience suggest that hybrids cannot survive in today’s world?
On the con side, it may be that a cooperative governance structure is no longer
needed. The large agricultural cooperatives were born under very different circum-
stances than those that prevail today, notably the massive informational imbalances
of the ﬁrst quarter of the twentieth century when farmers did not know the price of
their grain until they arrived at their local elevator by horse and wagon. These cir-
cumstances led to the perception, and perhaps the reality, of abuses by private grain
companies to which farmer-owned grain companies seemed an appropriate answer.
Since these circumstances no longer exist, perhaps the need for farmer control has
likewise disappeared.
Over against this argument, however, lies the discomfort of AU’s farmer board
memberswiththetakeover,andthesupporttheyreceivedfrommembers.Itstretches
the imagination to attribute this discomfort to century-old abuses, particularly in
the case of UGG, which was only partly motivated by the early twentieth-century
abuses of market power and very early had accommodated itself to the open mar-
ket. UGG occupied what Ian MacPherson (1979) called the “pragmatic” wing of the
co-op movement (p. 46), whose underlying philosophy was summed up in 1922 by
Edwin Nourse (1922) as “the new ‘coöperation American style,’ along the lines of
big business bargaining and ruthlessness. ...Taking the essential facts of the mar-
ket as he ﬁnds them, [the farmer] seeks merely to put himself in the most effective
position with reference to it”(pp. 585–586). Former UGG President Mac Runciman34 Journal of Cooperatives
implicitly agreed, summarizing his own view of cooperativism as doing “the things
a farmer wished to have done to improve his lot, and the essential part of it was
the marketing of grain because that improved his lot the most and the soonest,” and
supporting “the guy out there on the farm who puts his life and his bucks into farm-
ing [and who] should make the decisions [and] have an absolute controlling input
into how his business is handled” (Earl 2000, pp. 127, 141). Arguably, unless the
directors’ dissatisfaction is attributed to “agency theory” (and some interviewees
among management were quick to do so), then it was the loss of this vision, which
continues to have contemporary relevance, that caused the directors and at least
some members to wish for the preservation of the company.
It might also be argued that member governance is unnecessary because of an-
titrust legislation. This factor is mentioned by Hansmann (1999, p. 401) and was
cited by a number of interviewees—although not by company directors—as a rea-
son why it was not necessary to preserve AU in order to protect its members against
market abuse.
However,thispropositionignoresthefactthatengaginglegalorquasi-legalpro-
cesses of this nature takes a level of resources and organization that is not readily
available to all potentially aggrieved parties, not to mention the fact that the out-
come of such initiatives is always uncertain.7 In the transportation area, legal reme-
dies against abuses of market power are available to shippers through the Canada
Transportation Act, and these were utilized by the Canadian Wheat Board in 1997
to charge the railways with violating their “level of service” commitments to the
grain industry. This case illustrated the immense effort that is required to utilize
legal remedies to alleged abuses of market power. If farmers by themselves lack the
organization and resources to initiate an action with antitrust regulatory bodies, who
would do so on their behalf? A shareholder-controlled company is highly unlikely
to initiate action on behalf of its customers, whereas a member-controlled organiza-
tion, whose directors are both responsible and accessible to members, would have
both the resources and motivation to do so.
Does the actual disappearance of both AU and SWP point to the non-viability
of a hybrid structure? It would seem not. For both companies, there were factors
unique to the Western Canadian grain industry that bulked large in their demise,
including the destructive effects of the long period of ideological disputation that
delayed the needed reinvestment and two years of almost record poor crops that
reduced their revenues while that reinvestment was underway. In AU’s case, neither
the tension between management and board over farmer control, nor the apparent
lack of preparedness for a takeover bid in the belief that there was no imminent
threat, nor the board’s apparent lack of awareness of opposing legal views on the
principle of shareholder supremacy, were attributable to its hybrid status. Moreover,Vol. 23[2009] 35
SWP’s success in taking over AU was enabled by world ﬁnancial markets that were
awash in liquidity, and was not particularly aided by AU’s hybrid nature.
There are, of course, a number of factors, some discussed in this article, that
militate against the continued existence and success of cooperative style organi-
zations, whether they are traditional co-ops or hybrids: the weakness of member
dominated boards; society’s increasing comfort with the marketplace and the cor-
responding decline in empathy for co-op ideals; and the increasing propensity to
see farming as a business rather than a way of life. Hansmann (1999) also notes the
potential conﬂict of interest that exists between shareholders who want maximum
returns and members who are contributors to those returns. As noted earlier, UGG
and AU felt these tensions and received negative feedback from shareholders on
their governance structure. Arguably, too, farming in Western Canada no longer has
the heavy dependence on wheat production that it did in the 1920s. Today, canola,
and to a lesser extent so-called “specialty crops” like lentils, peas, and beans, all of
which trade through the open market, has increased farmers’ comfort with the mar-
ket and reduced the perception that cooperative enterprise is a necessary defence
against market power. (See also Hansmann 1999 regarding the negative impact of
“heterogeneity” on co-op organizations.)
Despite these factors, both SWP and AU achieved some signiﬁcant success.
AU’s aim, in 1993, was to raise much needed capital, both for re-investment in its
outdated country elevator system and to redeem its looming member equity obliga-
tions. Both these goals were met, and on balance it did better than its cooperative
competitors, absorbing two of them and emerging larger and stronger than the third
(the one that, a decade earlier, had been the largest and healthiest of the four). SWP,
immediately following its share issue in 1996, was also seen by shareholders as a
valuable investment, advancing their value from C$12 on issuance to almost C$25
by 1998 (Fulton & Lang, 2006). The subsequent fall was not initially attributable
to its hybrid status, but to some questionable investments and the two near-crop
failures that impaired its ﬁnancial viability.
The evidence from AU as to the viability of hybrid organizations is therefore
mixed, but what is certain is that, with the factors that militate against the success of
cooperative style organizations today, if a co-op wishes to access equity markets for
capital, it must have a clear game plan in mind, and AU’s experience does provide
some guidelines as to what such a game plan must include.
Notes
1. Note that SWP had made an overture to AU in 2005. After the AWP/MPE hostile bid
in 1997, and the 2005 approach by SWP, AU arguably might have begun to prepare for a
new takeover bid from a third party. However, the interviewees said that they did not think36 Journal of Cooperatives
anyone would be interested or equipped to try, particularly SWP, which, circa 2005, was by
far the weaker company. Note, too, that SWP’s ability to raise capital for the purchase was
aided by a ﬁnancial market that was highly, if self-delusionally, awash with liquidity. AU’s
unpreparedness and the high levels of liquidity in world ﬁnancial markets could be added
to the list of “operative factors” discussed below.
2. A personal note may be illustrative. When I ﬁrst worked for UGG in the mid-1970s as a
young man from Eastern Canada, and attended my ﬁrst of the company’s annual meetings,
I felt as if I had stepped back about 30 years or more in time. My reaction was similar to
my ﬁrst visit to a country elevator some years earlier when I felt that I had stepped into a
living museum (see Earl 2000, p. 177).
3. Another personal anecdote illustrates this point. Around the time that UGG issued its
ﬁrst public shares (1993), the company hired a team of marketing consultants to examine a
number of company practices. I was working for UGG at the time, and one of the consul-
tants said that most companies “would kill” to have customer advisory groups like UGG’s
local member committees (called “local boards” in the company’s lexicon). Despite this
advice, many in management were not favorably disposed to the local board structure and
viewed it as a relic of the past. See the previous bulleted point.
4. It must be stressed that this article is not intended, nor is the author qualiﬁed, to provide
legal advice.
5. Discussions with legal experts suggest that this analysis, and the conclusions that fol-
low, look only at corporate law, not securities law. The duty of securities administrators in
Canada is to protect target company shareholders, and their policies tend to favour takeovers
(Condon, Amand, & Sarra 2005). However, these same discussions suggest, and a review
of standard works conﬁrms (Condon, Amand, & Sarra 2005; Gillen 1998), that nothing
therein negates either a board’s duty to consider the best interests of the corporation or its
discretion to recommend rejection of, or not to make a recommendation on, a bid if they
believe that it is not in the corporation’s interest.
6. “Meeting Farmers’ Business Needs” was UGG’s, and subsequently AU’s, corporate
slogan.
7. Charles Dickens’ comment that “the law is a ass” (usually slightly misquoted as “the
law is an ass”) is well known. Rather less well known is his humorous observation in The
Old Curiosity Shop (1841): “Lawyers are shy of meddling with the Law on their own ac-
count, knowing it to be an edged tool of uncertain application, very expensive in the work-
ing, and rather remarkable for its properties of close shaving, than for its always shaving
the right person.”
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